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This paper presents a survey of the micro-econometric literature on the effects of R&D tax credits 
on firms’ innovation activities. We focus on one specific aspect that has not received sufficient 
attention in previous research: the sectoral dimension. Our meta-regression analysis (MRA) sets 
up a new database collecting a large number of firm-level studies on the effects of R&D tax 
credits and investigates the factors that may explain differences in the estimated effects that are 
reported in the literature. The main result of the MRA analysis is indeed that sectors matter. 
Micro-econometric studies that have focused on a sub-sample of high-tech industries have on 
average obtained a smaller estimated effect of R&D tax credits. The paper proposes a simple 
framework to investigate why the effects of R&D tax credits vary across sectors and points out 
new directions and hypotheses for future research.
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Do the effects of R&D tax credits  
vary across industries?  
A meta-regression analysis

1. Introduction 
R&D tax credits are a major public policy instrument that has the ob-
jective to increase private firms’ incentives to invest in innovative ac-
tivities. They are tax deductions that business enterprises can claim if 
they are involved in R&D activities, which have the effect of reducing 
the marginal costs of R&D investments faced by firms (Hall and Van 
Reenen, 2000). 
 
A large empirical literature has investigated the effects of fiscal incen-
tives to R&D, in the attempt to estimate the extent to which a given 
amount of tax credits leads to an increase in firms’ R&D investments. 
While the earlier literature focused on a few countries only, and in 
particular the US, an increasing number of micro-econometric studies 
on a large number of economies have been presented during the last 
few years (Parsons and Phillips, 2007; Mohnen and Lokshin, 2009). 
The exponential growth in the literature is partly due to the increasing 
popularity of tax credits, which are now adopted in more than 20 
OECD countries; but it has also been fostered by the greater availabil-
ity and diffusion of firm-level data in several countries, and particular-
ly in Europe (Bodas Freitas and von Tunzelmann, 2008; OECD, 
2010). 
 
The bulk of this micro-econometric literature provides estimates of the 
rate at which R&D investments increase due to the introduction of fis-
cal incentives (additionality ratio) or, correspondingly, the rate at 
which the marginal costs of R&D investments decrease (user-cost 
elasticity). One dominant characteristic common to most of the exist-
ing studies is that their main objective is to estimate the average effect 
of R&D tax credits in a large sample of firms. So far, however, the 
literature has not questioned explicitly whether this average estimated 
parameter may vary among industrial sectors, and the possible reasons 
for cross-industry differences. 
 
One of the major results in the field of innovation studies is that sec-
tors matter. Firms in different industries differ substantially in terms 
of the innovation strategy they adopt and the technological perfor-
mance they achieve. The sectoral context provides micro agents 
(firms) with a set of opportunities and constraints that greatly shape 
the way in which they organize their innovative activities (Pavitt, 
1984; Malerba, 2005). Specifically, the R&D distribution of firms var-
ies greatly by sectors. Other sector-specific factors – such as the de-
gree of market competition, technological opportunities, and the inten-
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sity of knowledge diffusion and spillover effects – do also differ sub-
stantially across industries. It is therefore reasonable to suspect that 
firms’ responsiveness to fiscal incentives to R&D, and the related in-
novation and productivity effects, may vary considerably among in-
dustries. 
 
So, do the effects of R&D policy support vary systematically by sec-
tor, and if so, why? Our paper intends to investigate this new research 
question by carrying out an updated overview of the literature and a 
meta-regression analysis to study whether the effects of tax credits 
differ across industries.   
 
Our meta-regression analysis (MRA) builds up a new database con-
taining information on a large number of recent firm-level studies on 
the effects of R&D tax credits. We then investigate the factors that 
may explain differences in the estimated effects that are reported in 
the literature. In addition to several other control factors, the key ex-
planatory variable that we focus on refers precisely to the sectoral di-
mension: our MRA regressions investigate whether those studies that 
have controlled for sectoral characteristics, e.g. by comparing high- 
and low-tech industries, have on average achieved different results 
than all other micro-econometric works. The main result of the MRA 
analysis is surprising: empirical studies that have focused on a sub-
sample of high-tech industries have on average obtained a smaller es-
timated effect of R&D tax credits.  
 
This is an interesting pattern that calls for further research. If corrobo-
rated by future investigations, this finding would cast some important 
doubts on the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives. This would in fact 
imply that fiscal resources intended to stimulate R&D and economic 
competitiveness have a relatively stronger effect on those industrial 
sectors that are characterized by low technological opportunities, 
sluggish demand conditions and weak spillover effects to the rest of 
the economy. If so, R&D tax incentives mechanisms should be rede-
signed in order to take into account the sector-specific conditions that 
shape innovation propensity and dynamics in different industries of 
the economy, and in particular allocate a greater amount of fiscal in-
centives to R&D to high-opportunity and technologically dynamic 
sectors. 
 
There exists a few other thorough overviews of this literature, and in 
particular Hall and Van Reenen (2000), Parsons and Phillips (2007), 
Mohnen and Lokshin (2009) and Cerulli (2012). The specific novelty 
of our survey paper and its intended contribution to the literature are 
twofold. First, the adoption of the MRA database and methodology 
opens up for future updates and extensions of this type of analysis of 
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the effects of R&D policy. Secondly, by explicitly investigating the 
role of the sectoral dimension, we create a bridge between the R&D 
policy literature, on the one hand, and the important strand of research 
on sectoral patterns of innovation, on the other. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the literature 
on the effects of R&D tax incentives. Section 3 presents the MRA da-
tabase, indicators and econometric methods. Section 4 summarizes the 
MRA regression results. Section 5 discusses a framework for future 
research. Section 6 concludes and outlines the implications of the 
work. 
 
   
 

2. The effects of R&D tax credits 
Business firms’ R&D investments are important for the growth and 
competitiveness of national economies. Several countries have recent-
ly increased their efforts to strengthen innovation performance by 
means of R&D policy, following e.g. the guidelines of the Lisbon 
Agenda in EU (Lundvall and Borràs, 2005). R&D policy can basically 
take two distinct forms: it can either allocate directly public R&D re-
sources through grants or procurement, or alternatively provide indi-
rect support by means of R&D tax incentives.  
 
R&D tax incentives are tax deductions that firms can claim if they are 
involved in R&D activities, thus providing them with an incentive to 
increase their innovation efforts. Tax credits are typically directed to 
all firms in the economy and hence let private agents decide what type 
of project to apply for. Their effect is to reduce the marginal cost of 
R&D investments (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000). By contrast, R&D 
subsidies target specific projects with high social returns and a longer 
time horizon, and their effect is to raise the marginal rate of return of 
R&D (David et al., 2000; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013). An ad-
vantage of tax incentives vis-a-vis subsidies is that the former are less 
subject to policy inefficiencies, since they are bottom up and based on 
agents’ decisions, whereas subsidies are more likely to incur in policy 
failure because they are highly dependent on the information available 
to the policy makers that manage the R&D programme and the strate-
gic priorities set by this.  
 
R&D tax incentives have by now become a popular innovation policy 
instrument. More than 20 OECD countries currently support private 
R&D investments through this type of schemes, including not only 
advanced countries but also developing economies such as Brazil, In-
dia, China and South Africa (OECD, 2010). The widespread adoption 
of this type of R&D support schemes has increasingly attracted the 
attention of innovation scholars and fostered the development of a 
large stream of applied research, which investigates the effects of tax 
credits on firms’ R&D expenditures by making use of firm-level data. 
While most of the early studies focused on enterprises in US States, 
the literature has recently been fostered by the increasing availability 
of firm-level datasets in several other countries and particularly in Eu-
rope.  
 
Hall and Van Reenen (2000) present a seminal overview of methods 
and results in this field. Parsons and Phillips (2007) provide an updat-
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ed survey of the main results in the literature, and Cerulli and Poti 
(2012) is a comprehensive discussion of econometric methods in 
R&D policy evaluation. Researchers interested in the effects of R&D 
tax incentives on firms’ innovation have typically adopted two distinct 
microeconometric approaches. The first is to estimate the following 
equation: 
 
RDij = η + βTCij + θXij + μij                                                               (1) 
 
where RDij is the R&D expenditures of firm i in industry j, TCij is a 
variable measuring the tax credit received by the enterprise, and Xij is 
a vector of firm-specific characteristics affecting its R&D strategies 
(e.g. past R&D, cash flow and financial conditions, size, technological 
capabilities). In this specification, the parameter β (expected positive) 
measures the additionality ratio, which indicates the average increase 
that a tax credit induces in firms’ R&D investments.1 The second ap-
proach estimates instead the following equation:  
 
RDij = κ + λUCij + ψXij + νij                                                            (2) 
 
in which UCij is a variable measuring the user cost of R&D (i.e. its 
marginal costs), and the parameter λ (expected negative) is the elastic-
ity of R&D with respect to its price, measuring by how much R&D 
will increase when its marginal costs decrease.2 
 
The bulk of the R&D policy evaluation literature has so far focused on 
the estimation of the average additionality ratio (in equation 1) or the 
average price elasticity (in equation 2) in each national economy. 
However, the field has so far neglected the study of the existence and 
extent of cross-industry differences in these estimated parameters. 
This is an important research gap and avenue for future research. 
 
One of the major results that has convincingly been shown within the 
field of innovation studies is that sectors matter. Firms in different 
industries differ substantially in terms of the innovation strategy they 
adopt and the technological performance they achieve. The sectoral 
context provides micro agents (firms) with a set of opportunities and 
constraints that greatly shape the way in which they organize their in-
novative activities (Pavitt, 1984; Malerba, 2005). The R&D distribu-
tion of firms varies greatly by sectors. R&D intensive firms are typi-
cally concentrated in technologically advanced industries, whereas 
                                                 
1  The additionality ratio is either pointed out as treatment effect, if matching or difference-
in-difference estimators are used, or simply as incrementality ratio through OLS and IV 
estimators. 
2  Hall and Van Reenen (2000: 467) define the user cost of R&D as the “pre-tax real rate of 
return on the marginal investment project that is required to earn a minimum rate of return 
after tax”. 
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enterprises in more traditional sectors do not make use of R&D activi-
ties as their dominant strategy to create or implement new technolo-
gies. But the innovation literature has also shown that sectors differ 
along several other dimensions, such as the degree of market competi-
tion, technological opportunities, and the intensity of knowledge dif-
fusion and spillover effects. 
 
Therefore, it is reasonable to ask whether the effects of R&D policy 
support vary systematically by sector, and if so, why. Our paper in-
tends to investigate this unexplored issue by carrying out an updated 
overview and a meta-regression analysis of the literature. 
 
 

3. MRA: data and methods 
3.1 Data and indicators 
Following the standard MRA methodology (see e.g. Stanley, 2001), 
the search process for relevant papers to include in the meta-analysis 
database included: Google- and Google Scholar searches; the EconLit 
database; the JSTOR-, Ideas- and Science Direct Journal databases; all 
relevant journals in the innovation field; working paper series; 
homepages of relevant academics in the field; tables and reference 
lists in previously published survey papers. Key words used in this 
literature search were “R&D tax credits”, “R&D tax incentives”, “ef-
fects of R&D tax credits”, and “effects of R&D tax incentives”.  
 
Only papers that presented an econometric analysis of the effects of 
R&D tax credits on firm-level innovation, and that provided enough 
information regarding the effect estimates and their standard errors (or 
t-statistics), were further considered.3 Our literature search focused 
more carefully on those more recent micro-econometric studies pro-
duced from 2000 onwards. Earlier studies had been identified and sur-
veyed in previous overview papers, which made some of our data col-
lection tasks easier.4 
 
Typically, each study on the effects of R&D fiscal incentives present 
estimation results for several regressions. There is no clear benchmark 
or rule in the meta-regression literature for deciding how many and 
which of these reported regressions should be included in a MRA da-
taset. In order to have as many observations as possible and thus in-
crease the variability of our sample, the selection criterion we used 
was somewhat broad. We included all different regressions produced 
by the same micro-econometric study as different observations in our 
dataset, as long as these regressions differed between them in some 
substantial way, e.g. in terms of their sub-sample, time period, model 
specification, tax-credit measure or dependent variable. This proce-
dure is in line with other recent meta-analysis exercises in other fields 
of economic research (e.g. Doucouliagos and Stanley 2009; Efendic et 
al. 2012).  
 
                                                 
3  Notice also that we have only focused on papers that study “first-order effects” of fiscal 
incentives (i.e. their direct effects on R&D investments), and disregard the few studies in-
vestigating their effects on other firm-level variables (e.g. innovation output and econom-
ic performance).  
4  Hall and Van Reenen (2000), Parsons and Phillips (2007), Mohnen and Lokshin (2009), 
Hall et al. (2009) and Yang (2011) were the survey papers of direct relevance that we 
found and that we used during the search process. 
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This data collection procedure left us with a total of 31 articles, pub-
lished between 1991 and 2012, and a total of 393 effect estimates. Ta-
bles 1 and 2 provide a complete list of references and some of the key 
characteristics of these 31 articles. Table 1 lists all the papers we 
found in which the dependent variable is the additionality ratio, esti-
mated by using the model specification pointed out in equation 1 (see 
section 2). Table 2 lists instead all the articles in our database in which 
the dependent variable is the user cost elasticity, estimated through 
equation 2. As explained in section 2, equations 1 and 2 represent two 
different econometric approaches to estimate the effects of R&D tax 
incentives, and we will therefore consider them separately in our 
MRA analysis. The MRA database we have produced is available 
online, in order to ensure replicability and further extensions of this 
work in future research.5 
 
Table 3 provides a list of the indicators we constructed on the MRA 
database and included in the analysis, along with their definition and 
descriptive statistics. Two of the indicators measure industry-specific 
characteristics (when these are considered in the micro-econometric 
studies): HTECH (dummy for high-tech subsamples) and MANUF 
(dummy for manufacturing subsamples). These variables test whether 
the effects of R&D tax credits are higher or lower when they are esti-
mated on different sectoral subsamples. The SME variable (dummy 
for SMEs subsamples) controls whether small and medium-sized 
companies have different estimated effects than the overall sample of 
firms used in each study. We also include three further control varia-
bles: RDt-1 (dummy for the inclusion of lagged R&D as control varia-
ble in each study), SUBSIDY (dummy for the inclusion of R&D sub-
sidies as control variable) and COUNTRY (dummy for the inclusion 
of country fixed effects). Several more characteristics of each paper 
and each regression were collected in the meta-database, and are 
available online for future extensions of this MRA study. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The database is available at: http://english.nupi.no/Activities/Projects/R-D-Policy-by-
Sector-A-Cross-Country-Investigation 
Table 1. List of papers included in the meta-regression database: Positive tax-credit measures (estimates of the addition-
ality ratio) 
 
 
Art. 
 # 
 
Reference 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Time Period* 
 
 
No. of 
Obs.** 
 
 
No. of 
Firms** 
 
 
No. of  
Estimates 
 
 
Avg. Effect 
Measure 
 
 
Avg. Value 
of t-statisitc 
 
1 Yang et al 2012 Taiwan 2001-2005 2588 . 6 0.1553333 2.21912475 
2 Billings et al 2001 US 1992-1998 1848 231 2 0.19065 1.035 
3 Paff 2005 California, Massachusetts (US) 1994-1999 780 . 6 0.33563 2.34463485 
4 Kasahara et al 2012 Japan 2000-2003 7057 . 48 1.5799792 1.22272662 
5 Yohei 2011 Japan 2006 1452 . 21 1.247429 4.89492298 
6 Huang 2009 Taiwan 2001-2005 3031 . 9 0.812667 3.33444444 
6 Huang 2009 Taiwan 2001-2005 3031 . 3 0.142 2.69785237 
7 Lee 2011 
Japan, Canada, Korea, Taiwan, 
China, India 
1997 815 
. 
13 0.176923 1.53461538 
8 Klassen et al 2004 US, Canada 1991-1997 821 168 10 1.9092 3.164 
9 Wang and Tsai 1998 Taiwan 1997 . 124 2 -12.785 -3.23 
10 Billings and Fried 1999 US 1994 . 113 1 0.018 2.25 
11 Duguet 2010 France 1993-2003 . 1645 30 0.075233 3.49466667 
11 Duguet 2010 France 1993-2003 . 1645 40 0.0333 1.2785 
12 Mercer-Blackman 2008 Colombia 2000-2002 2278 . 3 1.066667 2.18333333 
13 Berger 1993 US 1975-1989 3551 231 2 0.00065 3.397 
14 Swenson 1992 US 1975-1988 5006 . 6 0.03 -0.87833333 
15 Ho 2006 US 1975-1999 36977 . 72 3.723458 1.0670643 
16 
 
Hægeland and Møen 2007 
 
Norway 
 
1993-2005 
 
8233 
 
. 3 
 
0.496 
 
2.74173385 
 
 
Notes: *This is the longest time period for which data is available. Some of the estimates in these studies have however been obtained on different 
sub-periods. **This is the overall number of observations/firms available for each study. Some of the estimates in these studies have however 
been obtained on smaller sub-samples of observations. 
 
 
Table 2. List of papers included in the meta-regression database: Negative tax-credit measures (estimates of the user-cost 
elasticity) 
 
 
 
Art. 
 # 
 
Reference 
 
Country 
 
Time Pe-
riod* 
 
No. of 
Obs.** 
 
No. of 
Firms** 
 
No. of  
Estimates 
 
Avg. Effect 
Measure 
 
Avg. Value of 
t-statistic 
 
1 
 
Harris et al 2009 
 
Northern Ireland 
 
1998-2003 
 
2063 
 
563 
 
2 
 
-0.9465 
 
-4.645 
2 Lokshin and Mohnen 2012 Netherlands  1996-2004 1185 . 6 -0.503333 -3.11137566 
3 Baghana and Mohnen 2009 Canada 1997-2003 1386 . 8 -0.0995 -1.84950352 
4 Koga 2003 Japan 1991-1998 6098 904 6 -0.397617 -1.55593022 
5 Billings et al 2001 US 1992-1998 1848 231 2 -1.74105 -2.783 
6 Paff 2005 California, Massachusetts (US) 1994-1999 780 . 10 -7.37436 -0.54915181 
7 Paff 2004 California (US) 1997-1999 249 83 3 21.212233 0.80784899 
8 Rao 2010 US 1981-1991 7762 168 11 -0.479818 -7.36414319 
9 Hines 1993 US 1984-1989 . 116 8 -1.127038 -2.71886941 
10 Daegenais e al 1997 Canada 1975-1992 4859 434 1 -0.0686 -1.632 
11 Corchuelo and Martinez-Ros 2009 Spain 1990-2002 898 . 6 -0.465 -1.5833333 
11 Corchuelo and Martinez-Ros 2009 Spain 1990-2002 898 . 18 0.658889 1.85555556 
12 Hall 1993 US 1980-1991 4360 . 8 -0.48625 -5.73549559 
12 Hall 1993 US 1980-1991 4360 . 5 -1.674 -9.4101444 
13 Mulkay and Mairesse 2008 France 1983-2002 15977 2431 4 -1.6255 -10.0568749 
14 Mulkay and Mairesse 2003 France 1982-1996 6021 765 4 -0.72975 -4.26521144 
15 Lokshin and Mohnen 2007 Netherlands 1996-2004 2615 841 10 -0.5517 -2.74173385 
16 Parisi and Sembenelli 2003 Italy 1992-1997 4356 . 3 -4.36 -4.16269748 
17 
 
Poot et al 2003 
 
Netherlands 
 
1997-1998 
 
. 
 
1751 1 
 
-0.11 
 
-4.5 
 
 
Notes: *This is the longest time period for which data is available. Some of the estimates in these studies have however been obtained on different 
sub-periods. **This is the overall number of observations/firms available for each study. Some of the estimates in these studies have however 
been obtained on smaller sub-samples of observations. 
 
Table 3. Definition of indicators and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Definition Original Transformed* 
  Mean SE Mean SE 
INVSE 
The inverse of the standard error (SE) of the ef-
fect estimate. 
1.3471 4.8797 40.1641 377.3092 
HTECH 
Dummy: 1 if sub-sample is high-tech firms, 0 
otherwise. 
0.1399 0.3474 1.1125 5.9341 
MANUF 
Dummy: 1 if sub-sample is manufacturing firms, 
0 otherwise. 
0.0102 0.1005 0.0647 0.6814 
SME 
Dummy: 1 if sub sample is small or medium sized 
firms (SMEs), 0 otherwise. 
0.1730 0.3788 0.8361 3.5357 
RDt-1 
Dummy: 1 if lagged R&D is included as control 
in the econometric specification, 0 if not included. 
0.2952 0.4567 30.5213 377.7413 
COUNTRY 
Dummy: 1 if country fixed-effects or country 
interaction-effects are included as controls in the 
econometric specification, 0 if not included. 
0.1425 0.3500 0.5956 1.8267 
SUBSIDY 
 
Dummy: 1 if public R&D subsidies received by 
firms are included as control in the econometric 
specification, 0 if not included. 
 
0.2977 
 
0.4578 
 
4.1583 
 
11.3895 
 
 
Note: *These are transformed according to equation (4) i.e. divided by the effect 
estimates’ standard errors. 
3.2 Econometric methods 
The baseline specification of the meta-regression model regresses the 
effects size of interest (i.e. the estimated additionality ratio, or user-
cost elasticity) on an intercept and a measure of statistical precision, 
typically the standard error (SE): 
 
 
 
where s = 1,…, 31 indexes the studies in the meta-database, and i = 
1,…, 393 the individual regression estimates reported. ,  are esti-
mated, and  is the error term. To avoid heteroskedasticity, the 
common practice is to weight equation 3 by the standard error (SE) 
associated with each observation (Stanley et al. 2008). Equation 4, 
which is the weighted least squares (WLS) of equation (1), thus yields 
more efficient estimates: 
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After this transformation, the dependent variable is now the t-statistic 
( ) of the effect estimate in equation 3.6 However, the estimat-
ed parameters in equation 4 must still be interpreted in terms of 
changes in the size of the effect estimate, not in terms of changes in 
statistical significance (changes in t-statistics) (Efentic et al. 2011). 
Note also that the intercept and the precision coefficient are reversed 
in equation (4), and so the main variable of interest is now the inverse 
of the standard error .  
 
Egger et al. (1997) point out that the t-test of the intercept in equation 
4 is a test for publication bias, which indicates whether some omitted 
variables in equation 4 (e.g. characteristics of the studies or the re-
searchers that have produced them) may lead to a systematic selection 
effect and hence a bias in the estimated effect. Stanley (2008) argues 
that the meta-regression model can be used to test not only for publi-
cation selection, but also for estimating the true empirical effect after 
having controlled for publication bias. The first test is referred to as 
the funnel asymmetry test (FAT) and the latter as the precision-effect 
test (PET). More formally, FAT tests the hypothesis , 
where non-rejection implies lack of publication selection and rejection 
is consistent with either upward (positive sign) or downward publica-
tion bias (negative sign). As for the PET, the hypothesis  is 
tested, where rejection is consistent with the existence of an authentic 
empirical effect, and could be interpreted as the true effect corrected 
for any publication bias (Stanley, 2008).  
 
In this paper, in addition to these two standard terms, we are interested 
to investigate the extent to which different characteristics of the mi-
cro-econometric studies of R&D policy (see the indicators in table 3) 
explain the different estimated effects that are reported in the litera-
ture. In particular, we want to focus on the sectoral dimension, and 
investigate whether running the micro-econometric regressions on dif-
ferent sectoral sub-samples has a systematic influence on the estimat-
ed effect of R&D tax credits. We therefore extend the baseline speci-
fication in equation (4) to include a set of additional explanatory vari-
ables. Our multivariate meta-regression (MRA) model in equation 5 
includes a set of k moderator (control) variables: 
 
 
                                                 
6  The t-statistics, if not explicitly reported in the original paper, 
is calculated by using the formula: 
, and equivalently to find the SE (if not 
reported):   , see e.g. Fischer (1954).  
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where are the k = 1,…, K moderator variables each weighted by 
, and  are the k coefficients to be estimated in the meta-
regression. Each of these coefficients measures the impact of the cor-
responding moderator on the true empirical effect size. 
 

4. MRA results  
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the meta-regression analysis 
(MRA). Table 4 reports the results for the estimation of equation 5, 
referring to the empirical approach in which the dependent variable 
used in previous empirical studies is the additionality ratio (see equa-
tion 1, section 2). Table 5 does instead report the estimation results 
referring to the second model specification that is typically adopted in 
the literature, which has as dependent variable the user cost elasticity 
(see equation 2, section 2).  
 
In each of these tables, we progressively include the various explana-
tory variables, going from the baseline to the complete version of the 
model. Specification 1 only includes the constant (the publication bias 
effect) and the INVSE variable (measure of the true empirical effect 
of R&D tax incentives). Specification 2 includes the two variables 
measuring industry-specific characteristics: HTECH (dummy for 
high-tech subsamples), the variable of our main interest, and the con-
trol variable MANUF (dummy for manufacturing subsamples). Speci-
fication 3 adds the SME variable (dummy for SMEs subsamples). 
Specification 4 also includes three further control variables: RDt-1 
(dummy for the inclusion of lagged R&D as control variable in the 
study), SUBSIDY (dummy for the inclusion of R&D subsidies as a 
control variable) and COUNTRY (dummy for the inclusion of country 
fixed effects).  
 
In both of the tables, the R-squared indicates that the meta-regressions 
have a relatively good explanatory power, so that the model takes into 
account some of the most important characteristics that explain varia-
tion in the estimated effects of R&D tax credits among different  
micro-econometric studies available in the literature. Note that the 
signs of all estimated coefficients in table 4 are just the opposite as 
those in table 5, for the obvious reason that the former table has a pos-
itive measure as dependent variable (additionality ratio), whereas the 
latter makes use of a negative one (user cost elasticity). 
 
In both tables 4 and 5, the estimated parameter for the constant is sig-
nificant, providing evidence of a publication (selection) bias effect. 
The parameter is positive in table 4 and negative in table 5, indicating 
that previous studies overestimated the effect of R&D tax credits on 
firms’ innovation activities when they failed to control for a set of an-
cillary factors that may affect this relationship (and that our MRA re-
gressions try to correct for). However, in spite of this publication bias, 
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there is also significant evidence of a true empirical effect (measured 
by the variable INVSE), which is obviously positive for the addition-
ality ratio (table 4) and negative for the user cost elasticity (table 5). 
 
Before looking at the results of the estimations for the variable of 
main interest for this study, HTECH, let us briefly discuss the results 
for the set of control variables we have included in our MRA model in 
tables 4 and 5. The variable MANUF is statistically significant in both 
tables. Its estimated coefficient (positive in table 4 and negative in ta-
ble 5) indicates that those studies that have run regressions on a sub-
sample of manufacturing companies (i.e. excluding service firms) 
have on average obtained a greater estimated effect of fiscal incentives 
to R&D. This result is not surprising, since the innovation literature 
has often pointed out that the bulk of R&D activities is concentrated in 
manufacturing industries, whereas enterprises in the service sectors 
innovate through a variety of different strategies among which R&D is 
certainly not the dominant mode (Castellacci, 2008). It is therefore 
reasonable to infer that service firms are less responsive to R&D poli-
cy schemes than manufacturing companies. Next, the variable SME 
tests whether the effects of R&D tax credits differ when they are esti-
mated for sub-samples of SMEs. The variable is weakly significant in 
the full model specification in regressions 4. When estimated with 
precision, the coefficient indicates that the additionality ratio (user 
cost elasticity) is smaller (larger) for SMEs than for the whole sample 
of firms. 
 
The next three variables are control factors that micro-econometric 
studies in this field should in principle include in the econometric 
specification but sometimes do not (e.g. due to the lack of available 
data). When the lagged R&D variable (RDt-1) is included in the speci-
fication to alleviate endogeneity issues, the estimated effect of R&D 
policy is obviously smaller in size. The same effect arises when the 
control variable SUBSIDY is included in the regression. This is a 
measure of R&D subsidies received by the firm in addition to the 
R&D tax credits, so it is reasonable that when this is controlled for the 
estimated additionality ratio turns out to be lower. Finally, the control 
variable COUNTRY tests for the inclusion of country fixed effects in 
the regressions, which are only used by the few studies having availa-
bility of firm-level data for more than one country, or States within a 
country (typically the US). This variable is only significant in table 4. 
Its estimated sign indicates that the additionality effect is higher for 
those works including country-fixed effects, and this result is arguably 
driven by firm-level estimates obtained on US datasets, where fiscal 
incentives to R&D have a longer tradition and more established ef-
fects than in other OECD countries.  
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Let us now shift the focus to the results for the variable of main inter-
est for our paper: HTECH, the dummy variable indicating whether 
each micro-econometric regression reported in the literature focuses 
on a sub-sample of high-tech industries (dummy = 1), or rather con-
siders the whole sample available without any further control for sec-
tor-specific differences (dummy = 0). This variable turns out to be sta-
tistically significant. Its estimated coefficient is negative in table 4 and 
positive in table 5. This means that micro-econometric regressions that 
have focused on a sub-sample of high-tech industries have on average 
obtained a smaller estimated effect of R&D tax credits (i.e. a lower 
additionality ratio, or a higher user cost elasticity). 
 
This is an interesting result that has not previously been pointed out in 
the literature. In our MRA dataset, most of the micro-econometric 
studies do not control for sectoral characteristics and do not run sepa-
rate regressions for different groups of industries. Only a limited 
number of studies do this, either by focusing on specific industries, or 
by running separate regressions for high-tech and low-tech industries. 
Specifically, the studies of Wang and Tsai (1998), Huang (2009) and 
Yang et al. (2012) focus on Taiwanese companies, and find that enter-
prises in the electronics sector are more responsive to fiscal incen-
tives. Paff (2004 and 2005) and Ho (2006) investigate the effects of 
the alternate incremental credit (AIC) in various US States, pointing 
out remarkable differences between two high-tech industries: pharma-
ceuticals and software. Lee (2011) estimates firm-level regressions for 
six countries (Canada, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China and India), and 
finds among other things that the degree of competition of each indus-
try affects firms’ responsiveness to R&D tax credits.7  
 
However, although providing some interesting and significant evi-
dence that the effects of R&D tax incentives vary across sectors, these 
few previous studies have mostly treated this as a marginal aspect and 
not investigated at length whether this is a systematic effect, and what 
sector-specific factors may explain these patterns. In short, the exist-
ing literature contains some clear indications of the existence of cross-
industry differences, but it has never explicitly investigated this point. 
So, how could these patterns be explained? We point out two possible 
alternative explanations. 
 
The first and most simple one is that it may be natural to expect that 
firms in low-tech sectors, which have on average a lower R&D intensity 
than companies in high-tech sectors, may find it relatively easier to in-
                                                 
7  In addition to these studies included in our MRA dataset, notice also that in their seminal 
paper Bloom and Van Reenen (2002) did also obtain user cost elasticities for all manufac-
turing industries in their sample. Table 3 in their article indicates that the estimated user 
cost elasticities are greater for lower-tech sectors and smaller (or not significant) for most 
high-tech sectors. 
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crease their R&D expenditures in response to a tax credit scheme. Due to 
the lower initial conditions, in fact, even a small R&D increase as a re-
sponse to fiscal incentives will for low-tech firms represent a relatively 
large additionality effect. By contrast, achieving an additionality effect 
will be more demanding and difficult for enterprises in high-tech sectors, 
due to the already high level of R&D commitment they have.  
 
However, this argument is not as obvious as it may appear at first. A 
large literature in innovation studies has extensively investigated sec-
toral patterns of innovation, and shown that companies in different 
branches of the economy follow substantially different innovation 
modes and strategies (Pavitt, 1984; Malerba, 2005). In particular, in 
several low-tech and traditional industries, R&D is not a dominant 
strategy to develop new technologies, and firms rely instead on other 
channels such as the purchase of new capital machineries, and/or or-
ganizational and marketing innovations not based on formal R&D ac-
tivities. The fact that the R&D propensity of firms varies substantially 
across sectors casts some doubts on the first explanation we have 
pointed out. 
 
So, a different reason explaining why tax credits have a stronger addi-
tionality effect in low-tech industries than high-tech sectors may be 
based on the sectoral patterns of innovation literature, and in particular 
on the concept of technological and economic opportunities (Dosi, 
1982). Industrial sectors differ in terms of technological opportunities 
– the ease with which innovative input leads to technological output – 
as well as demand conditions and economic opportunities. Low-tech 
and mature sectors are typically characterized by a lower level of 
technological and economic opportunities and less dynamic demand 
conditions than high-tech industries (Von Tunzelmann and Acha, 
2005). It may be argued that firms in low-tech sectors, due to the low-
er level of market opportunities they face, are on average more likely 
to experience financial constraints and, for this reason, they may find 
it convenient to apply to a tax credits scheme in order to enjoy fiscal 
benefits. According to this second argument, the higher additionality 
of companies in low-tech sectors could be interpreted not as an indica-
tion of technological dynamism and catch up, but rather as a signal 
that firms in low-tech and traditional industries are eager to apply to 
tax credit schemes primarily to achieve fiscal benefits and alleviate 
their financial constraints rather than for increasing their R&D in-
vestments in a permanent manner. 
 
These two alternative explanations have not previously been discussed 
in the literature. It is not possible here to conclude which of them is 
more plausible, and this discussion does indeed call for future re-
search. We further discuss this issue and propose further avenue for 
future research in the next section. 
Table 4. MRA results: Positive tax-credit measures. Dependent variable: TSTAT (t-statistic of the estimated additionality ratio) 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Robust SE Cluster SE Robust SE Cluster SE Robust SE Cluster SE Robust SE Cluster SE 
CONSTANT 
1.891494 
(15.29)*** 
1.891494 
(4.88)*** 
1.899479 
(15.11)*** 
1.899479 
(5.51)*** 
1.916535 
(14.79)*** 
1.916535 
(5.50)*** 
1.444614 
(9.35)*** 
1.444614 
(5.87)*** 
INVSE 
0.0003052 
(3.08)*** 
0.0003052 
(3.23)*** 
.0003106 
(3.07)*** 
0.0003106 
(3.45)*** 
0.0003071 
(3.03)*** 
0.0003071 
(3.38)*** 
0.0316881 
(3.97)*** 
0.0316881 
(2.89)** 
HTECH 
 
 
 
-0.0340836 
(-3.01)*** 
-0.0340836 
(-2.67)** 
-0.0312554 
(-2.74)*** 
-0.0312554 
(-2.50)** 
-0.0210417 
(-1.76)* 
-0.0210417 
(-1.72) 
MANUF 
 
 
 
0.8297275 
(11.65)*** 
0.8297275 
(12.32)*** 
0.8263947 
(11.51)*** 
0.8263947 
(12.14)*** 
0.6178825 
(6.75)*** 
0.6178825 
(2.93)** 
SME 
 
 
   
-0.0218241 
(-1.40) 
-0.0218241 
(-1.58) 
-0.0036951 
(-0.22) 
-0.0036951 
(-0.27) 
RDt-1 
 
 
     
-0.0313152 
(-3.93)*** 
-0.0313152 
(-2.85)** 
COUNTRY 
 
 
     
0.2694418 
(3.82)*** 
0.2694418 
(1.31) 
SUBSIDY 
 
 
     
-0.0264371 
(-1.76)* 
-0.0264371 
(-1.28) 
         
R-squared 
 
0.0045 
 
0.0045 
 
0.0654 
 
0.0654 
 
0.0670 
 
0.0670 
 
0.2050 
 
0.2050 
 
Observations 
 
277 
 
277 
 
277 
 
277 
 
277 
 
277 
 
277 
 
277 
 
 
Notes: Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. t-statistic in parentheses. 
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Table 5 MRA results: Negative tax-credit measures. Dependent variable: TSTAT (t-statistic of the estimated user-cost elasticity) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Robust SE Cluster SE Robust SE Cluster SE Robust SE Cluster SE Robust SE Cluster SE 
CONSTANT 
-1.559303 
(-4.63)*** 
-1.559303 
(-1.60) 
-1.59566 
(-4.63)*** 
-1.59566 
(-1.57) 
-1.667683 
(-4.76)*** 
-1.667683 
(-1.65) 
-2.093408 
(-4.77)*** 
-2.093408 
(-3.45)*** 
INVSE 
-0.1455175 
(-5.27)*** 
-0.1455175 
(-3.43)*** 
-0.1427606 
(-5.22)*** 
-0.1427606 
(-3.35)*** 
-0.1439019 
(-5.12)*** 
-0.1439019 
(-3.41)*** 
-0.2342409 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.2342409 
(-3.35)*** 
HTECH 
 
 
 
4.465753 
(5.37)*** 
4.465753 
(2.34)** 
4.601495 
(5.37) 
4.601495 
(2.42)** 
6.679015 
(5.51)*** 
6.679015 
(4.65)*** 
MANUF 
 
 
 
-0.5464603 
(-16.67)*** 
-0.5464603 
(-6.06)*** 
-.5383328 
(-15.78)*** 
-0.5383328 
(-5.92)*** 
-0.5316152 
(-11.74)*** 
-0.5316152 
(-7.77)*** 
SME 
 
 
   
0.1538882 
(2.23)** 
0.1538882 
(1.37) 
0.0779268 
(1.87)* 
0.0779268 
(1.34) 
RDt-1 
 
 
     
0.1249167 
(1.86)* 
0.1249167 
(1.74) 
COUNTRY 
 
 
     
-1.1981 
(-1.20) 
-1.1981 
(-1.06) 
SUBSIDY 
 
 
     
1.128952 
(5.74)*** 
1.128952 
(6.89)*** 
         
R-squared 
 
0.2716 
 
0.2716 
 
0.2973 
 
0.2973 
 
0.3062 
 
0.3062 
 
0.4797 
 
0.4797 
 
Observations 
 
116 
 
116 
 
116 
 
116 
 
116 
 
116 
 
116 
 
116 
 
 
Notes: Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. t-statistic in parentheses. 
 
5. A framework for future research 
So, how should future research investigate cross-industry differences 
in the effects of R&D tax incentives? We provide here a simple 
framework outlining new directions and hypotheses for future re-
search. Consider an economy with s sectors. Each industry j has a 
population of Nj (homogenous) firms, out of which nj enterprises re-
ceive an R&D tax credit at time t. The (average) additionality ratio in 
this sector can be defined as: 
 
αj = (RDj; t+1 – RDj; t) / RDj; t                                                              (6) 
 
where RDj is the R&D expenditures of each firm in a given period. 
The total additional R&D spending induced by the tax incentive 
scheme in industry j is then: 
 
ΔRDj = nj (RDj; t+1 – RDj; t)                                                                (7) 
 
This total increment can be rewritten as the product of three factors: 
 
ΔRDj = αj • (nj / Nj) • (Nj • RDj)                                                        (8) 
 
The first factor is the (average) additionality ratio defined above. The 
second is the share of firms in the industry that have received R&D 
support, indicating the sector-specific propensity of firms to respond 
to R&D policy incentives, and/or their ability to apply and receive 
such fiscal benefits. The third factor is the total R&D pool, i.e. the to-
tal amount of R&D expenditures carried out by all enterprises in that 
sector. The literature surveyed in the previous sections has typically 
focused on the first factor only. However, if we want to estimate the 
overall innovation effects of a tax incentive scheme, the second and 
third factors matter as well. All of the three factors pointed out in 
equation 8 are arguably sector-specific: they can reasonably be ex-
pected to vary systematically across industries, and it is therefore im-
portant to analyze how variations in sector-specific characteristics 
shape the effects of R&D policy on firms’ innovative activities. 
 
Let us now shift the focus to the economic effects of R&D tax credits. 
The additional R&D carried out in industry j leads, through the crea-
tion of new products and processes, to an increase in the sector’s TFP 
level: 
 
ΔTFPj = ΔRDj • γj                                                                              (9) 
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The parameter γj defines the level of technological opportunities in the 
sector, which indicates, as noted in the previous section, the ease with 
which innovative inputs are translated into innovative output and val-
ue added (Dosi, 1982). This is as well-known an industry-specific pa-
rameter, which varies substantially across sectors (and historical peri-
ods), tending to be high in technologically advanced and emerging 
sectors, and low in more traditional and mature industries.  
 
Besides, the additional R&D carried out in industry j will also lead to 
economic and productivity gains in other industries of the economy 
through a set of inter-industry knowledge spillover effects (Wieser, 
2005). These can be defined as: 
 
ΔTFPk = ΔRDj • δj • πj;k                                                                  (10) 
 
where k indicates all other sectors of the economy except j (k = 1, …, 
s; k ≠ j); πj;k measures the technological proximity between j and k (i.e. 
the intensity of the knowledge diffusion from the former to the latter 
sector); and δj represents the knowledge spillover potential embodied 
in industry j. The knowledge spillover potential indicates the extent to 
which the advanced knowledge produced by firms in sector j has the 
potential to drive the growth of other industries. This is in other words 
a measure of the so-called pervasiveness of the new technologies pro-
duced in sector j, indicating whether they have widespread impacts 
throughout the whole economic system or rather weak effects on a 
limited set of related industries. Besides the degree of novelty of the 
new technologies, sectoral pervasiveness also depends on the position 
of each industry in the economic system, and the function it plays: up-
stream industries producing advanced knowledge are likely to lead to 
stronger spillover effects in the whole economy than downstream 
(supplier-dominated) industries (Pavitt, 1984; Castellacci, 2008). 
 
In short, while the literature on R&D policy evaluation has so far fo-
cused on the estimation of the (average) additionality ratio for the 
whole economy, the framework described here points out the need to 
broaden up the focus of future research towards the joint investigation 
of three related factors: (1) the total incremental effect of the tax credit 
in a given industry (ΔRDj; equation 8); (2) the productivity effects of 
this in the same industry (ΔTFPj; equation 9); (3) the spillover effects 
to all other industries (ΔTFPk; equation 10). From a policy point of 
view, the estimation of the average additionality ratio on which the 
literature has so far focused (i.e. the parameter αj above) does not pro-
vide sufficient information to assess the overall innovation and eco-
nomic effects of an R&D tax incentive scheme. Only the joint consid-
eration of the three dimensions pointed out above can enable a com-
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plete assessment of the benefits of R&D policy.8 And the key point 
that we want to make here is that all of the three factors are sector-
specific, as pointed out in the innovation literature, so that it is reason-
able to expect the effects of R&D tax incentives to vary systematically 
across industries. 
 
Specifically, we outline three directions for future research, and for 
each of these we formulate a general hypothesis for future theoretical 
and empirical studies in this field. The first direction refers to the 
study of the total incremental effect of the tax credit in a given indus-
try. Consider equation 8. All of the three terms in this equation are 
likely to differ substantially across industries. The total R&D pool 
term (Nj • RDj) is supposedly greater for a high-tech industry than a 
low-tech sector. The other two terms – the propensity to apply to the 
tax credits programme (nj / Nj) and the average additionality ratio in 
the market (αj) – are also sector-specific. In fact, a large literature on 
competition and innovation has previously investigated the relation-
ship between competiton conditions within each industry and the in-
centives of firms to engage in R&D. This traditional literature has po-
tentially important implications for the study of the effectiveness of 
R&D policy. 
 
On the one hand, industry-level competition may decrease the monop-
oly rents of prospective innovative firms, thus reducing their incen-
tives to engage in R&D activities. This is an argument traditionally 
known as the Schumpeterian effect, which postulates the existence of 
a negative relationship between the degree of competition in an indus-
try and the R&D intensity of firms (Geroski 1990; Nicoletti and Scar-
petta 2004; Tang 2006). If this effect holds, then we should arguably 
expect firms’ propensity to apply to a tax credits programme (nj / Nj) 
and the average additionality ratio (αj) to be lower in a highly com-
petitive industry than in an oligopolistic market. 
 
On the other hand, more recent research on competition and innova-
tion has also pointed out the possibility that product market competi-
tion may also turn out to boost R&D investments, since it may in-
crease the incremental profits that firms obtain by investing in R&D 
activities (Aghion et al. 1997 and 2005; Castellacci, 2011). This sec-
ond argument, the escape-competition effect, points out that the rela-
tionship between the degree of market competition and innovation 
may hence be positive, and even more so in neck-to-neck industries 
where competiton between rival firms is fierce. If this effect prevails, 
we should instead expect that the propensity to apply to a tax credits 
                                                 
8  The total benefits of an R&D support scheme should then be compared with its costs, 
including both the costs in terms of fiscal resources that are devoted to private companies’ 
R&D activities and the administrative costs that policy-makers incur to set up and manage 
the scheme (David et al., 2000; Hall and Van Reenen, 2000). 
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programme and the additionality ratio is greater in a highly competi-
tive industry than in an oligopolistic market.9 In short, it is not possi-
ble to determine ex-ante which of these two effects prevails, so that 
future empirical research should examine how the effects of R&D tax 
credits on firms’ innovation are affected by the degree of competition 
that characterizes each sector. 
 
The second direction for future research relates to the productivity ef-
fects of R&D tax credits within a given sector (see equation 9). As 
pointed out above, the level of technological opportunities in a given 
industry (the parameter γj) is an industry-specific factor that varies 
substantially across sectors (Dosi, 1982; Castellacci and Zheng, 2010). 
Opportunities are typically high in technologically advanced and new 
emerging sectors, and lower in more traditional and mature industries 
(Von Tunzelmann and Acha, 2005). Hence, it would be reasonable to 
expect that the productivity effects of R&D tax credits within the 
same industry is positively related to the level of technological oppor-
tunities that characterize the industry at any given time. 
 
Finally, the third direction for future research refers to the spillover 
effects that R&D tax credits in sector j have on all other industries k of 
the economy (equation 10 above). The literature on sectoral patterns 
of innovation has previously pointed out sectoral taxonomies that 
identify some key sector-specific dimensions that characterize the in-
novative process in each industry and shape its technological trajecto-
ry and economic performance over time (Malerba, 2005). One im-
portant result in this literature is that some sectors have a high degree 
of pervasiveness, and hence a strong knowledge spillover potential 
(the parameter δj in equation 7), thus playing a central role as key 
drivers of the whole economic system. In particular, upstream indus-
tries that produce advanced technological knowledge are likely to lead 
to stronger spillover effects throughout the whole economy than 
downstream (supplier-dominated) industries (Pavitt, 1984; Castellacci, 
2008). In terms of the effectiveness of R&D policy, this would imply 
that the spillover effects that R&D tax credits in sector j have on all 
other industries k of the economy should be expected to be substan-
tially stronger for upstream knowledge intensive industries (e.g. 
knowledge-based services, science-based manufacturing) than for 
downstream supplier-dominated sectors (e.g. personal goods and ser-
vice providers). 
 
The three general hypotheses that we have sketched here are not only 
relevant for future academic research in this field, but do also have an 
                                                 
9  This hypothesis is also in line with the empirical results of Lee (2011), which finds the 
degree of market competition to be positively related to the average estimated additionali-
ty ratio. 
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important policy dimension. In fact, the bottom line of our argument is 
that the total additional R&D spending induced by a tax incentive 
scheme (∑jΔRDj) should to the extent possible be concentrated in in-
dustries with high technological opportunities and in sectors that lead 
to strong spillover effects to the rest of the economy. By contrast, if 
the R&D additionality effect is mainly skewed towards low opportuni-
ty mature sectors and/or downstream industries with low pervasive-
ness and spillover potential, the overall effect of the R&D tax credit 
scheme in the national economy will be sub-optimal.  
 
In this respect, the MRA results presented in the previous section 
seem to cast some doubts on the efficiency of this type of R&D poli-
cy. Those results do in fact suggest that the additionality effects of fis-
cal incentives to R&D are on average stronger for low-tech industries 
than for high-tech sectors. If this finding will be corroborated by fu-
ture empirical research, it would imply that fiscal resources intended 
to stimulate R&D and economic competitiveness tend to benefit rela-
tively more those branches of the economy that do not have the high-
est innovative potential and economic impact on the growth of the na-
tional economy. If so, R&D tax incentives mechanisms should be re-
designed in order to take into account the sector-specific conditions 
that shape innovation propensity and dynamics in different industries 
of the economy. 
 
 

6. Conclusions  
The paper has carried out a survey of the micro-econometric literature 
on the effects of R&D tax incentives on firms’ innovation activities. 
This literature has rapidly expanded in the last few years, due to the 
increasing popularity of fiscal incentives as a policy tool, and also 
thanks to the larger availability of firm-level datasets in several coun-
tries in the OECD area. This empirical research typically leads to the 
conclusion that tax credits have a positive effect on corporate R&D 
investments, by increasing the amount of R&D carried out by each 
company, and by lowering its marginal costs. Our survey has in par-
ticular focused on one specific aspect that has not received sufficient 
attention in previous research: the sectoral dimension. Out of the large 
amount of micro-econometric studies in this field, only a limited 
number of them has controlled for cross-industry differences in the 
estimated effects of R&D policy, and no previous work has discussed 
a conceptual framework to investigate whether and why this could be 
the case.  
 
To study this unexplored question, we have carried out a meta-
regression analysis: this has set up and made available a new database 
collecting a large number of firm-level studies on the effects of R&D 
tax credits, and then investigated the factors that may explain differ-
ences in the estimated effects that are reported in the literature. The 
key explanatory factor we have focused on is precisely the sectoral 
dimension: our MRA regressions have investigated whether those 
studies that have controlled for sectoral characteristics, e.g. by com-
paring high- and low-tech industries, have on average achieved differ-
ent results than all other micro-econometric works. The main result of 
the MRA analysis is indeed that sectors matter. Micro-econometric 
studies that have focused on a sub-sample of high-tech industries have 
on average obtained a smaller estimated effect of R&D tax credits. 
This is an interesting result that has not previously been pointed out in 
the literature.  
 
Why may this be the case – why do the effects of R&D tax credits 
vary across sectors, and what are the possible implications for policy? 
These questions open up a new avenue for theoretical and empirical 
research in this field. The second part of our paper has proposed a 
simple framework to investigate these issues and pointed out some 
more specific new directions and hypotheses for future research. In 
short, our argument is that the overall benefits of an R&D tax incen-
tives scheme depend on the complex interplay of three related factors: 
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(1) the total incremental effect of the tax credit in a given industry; (2) 
the productivity effects of this in the same industry; (3) the spillover 
effects to all other industries. All of the three factors are sector-
specific: firms’ responsiveness to fiscal incentives to R&D and their 
economic effects are arguably closely dependent on sectoral character-
istics such as the degree of market competition, the level of technolog-
ical opportunities, and the intensity of knowledge diffusion and inter-
industry spillover effects. Future research should therefore develop a 
theoretical and empirical framework to understand how these sector-
specific characteristics shape firms’ responses to R&D policy. 
 
This research task is highly relevant for innovation policy-making. In 
fact, the bottom line of our argument is that the total additional R&D 
spending induced by a tax incentive scheme should to the extent pos-
sible be concentrated in industries with high technological opportuni-
ties and in sectors that lead to strong spillover effects to the rest of the 
economy. By contrast, if the R&D additionality effect is mainly 
skewed towards low opportunity mature sectors and/or downstream 
industries with low pervasiveness and spillover potential, the overall 
effect of the R&D tax credit scheme in the national economy will be 
sub-optimal.  
 
In fact, our main MRA result – that the additionality effects of fiscal 
incentives to R&D are on average stronger for low-tech industries 
than for high-tech sectors – casts some doubts on the efficiency of this 
type of R&D policy. If this finding will be corroborated by future em-
pirical research, it would imply that fiscal resources intended to stimu-
late R&D and economic competitiveness tend to benefit relatively 
more those branches of the economy that do not have the highest in-
novative potential and economic impact on the growth of the national 
economy. If so, R&D tax incentives mechanisms should be redesigned 
in order to take into account the sector-specific conditions that shape 
innovation propensity and dynamics in different industries of the 
economy, e.g. by introducing a sectorally differentiated incentive 
scheme to give stronger support to firms in more innovative and high-
er-opportunity industries. This policy implication is however far from 
conclusive, and will necessitate a substantial amount of further com-
parative research on different countries and industrial sectors.  
 
In addition, two more policy-related considerations will have to be 
undertaken in order to assess the efficiency, or possible sub-
optimality, of R&D policy. First, countries differ substantially in 
terms of their specialization patterns and industrial structure. Some 
economies, even in the presence of sub-optimal effects of R&D tax 
incentives, may still decide to invest in technological upgrading of 
domestic mature sectors that may be relevant in terms of employment 
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or other policy objectives (e.g. availability of natural resources) – ra-
ther than focusing its R&D efforts in the promotion of high-tech in-
dustries. The economic efficiency of R&D policy should therefore be 
balanced with a set of other policy considerations and objectives.  
 
Secondly, the evaluation of the effects of fiscal incentives to R&D 
should to the extent possible be carried out jointly with the study of 
the impacts of R&D subsidies. The latter often have a more explicit 
policy, and hence sectoral, dimension and set of priorities, and this 
may contribute to re-balance, or strengthen, the national pattern of 
R&D specialization of each economy. The literature has so far sepa-
rately studied the effects of R&D tax credits and R&D subsidies. Fu-
ture research should investigate these jointly, and study how different 
combinations of them may lead to different technological trajectories 
and economic outcomes. 
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